









Since the Citizens United
1
 decision in 2010 reduced Congress’s 
ability to constitutionally regulate money in elections, proponents of 
campaign finance reform have looked for alternative ways to achieve the 
goals of greater transparency and reduce the amount of money spent in 
federal elections. In the three years since Citizens United, the amount of 
money spent in federal campaigns has increased exponentially. Although 
the total money spent for the 2012 election has yet to be finalized, virtu-
ally all publicly available estimates have the total spending at over $6 
billion.
2
 This total is more than $700 million higher than the amount 
spent in the 2008 election.
3
 In fact, the total amount of money spent in 
federal elections has nearly doubled since 2000.
4
 In the four years be-
tween 2008 and 2012, the money spent on congressional races alone has 
increased by over $1 billion.
5
 
Beyond the direct impact that Citizens United had on the amount of 
money spent in political races, many media commentators and law pro-
fessors have since suggested that traditional mechanisms for controlling 
money in politics, specifically restrictions on campaign contributions and 
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 1. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 2. See, e.g., John Hudson, The Most Expensive Election in History by the Numbers, ATLANTIC 
WIRE (Nov. 6, 2012), http://www.theatlanticwire.com/politics/2012/11/most-expensive-election-
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 5. Id. 
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expenditures, are now impossible as a result of this case.
6
 It is undeniable 
that Citizens United drastically altered the landscape of campaign finance 
reform, allowing for massive increases in the amount of money spent on 
political campaigns.
7
 Furthermore, when the Supreme Court had a 
chance to revisit the precedents set in Citizens United in 2012, it refused 
to hear the case, signaling that reform advocates will have to work within 
the restrictions enshrined by Citizens United.
8
 
Citizens United represents a serious blow to the traditional methods 
used to restrict the amount of money in politics: limitations on the 
amounts campaigns can accept and spend. 
9
 Moreover, despite the diffi-
culties facing federal reform laws, public distrust of Congress continues 
to grow,
10
 demonstrating the need to take steps to help restore faith in the 
political process. Although some would argue that meaningful campaign 
finance reform is impossible in the wake of Citizens United, this belief is 
shortsighted and ignores other potential methods to control the flow of 
money into politics. The federal government should look to state gov-
ernments to find new ways to regulate campaign finance. Specifically, 
the federal government should adopt a specific temporal limitation on 
when incumbent members of Congress can accept campaign contribu-
tions. 
                                                          
 6. See, e.g., Michael S. Kang, The End of Campaign Finance Law, 98 VA. L. REV. 1, 2 (2013); 
Senator Tom Udall, Amend the Constitution to Restore Public Trust in the Political System: A Prac-
titioner’s Perspective on Campaign Finance Reform, 29 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 235 (2010); Russ 
Feingold, The Money Crisis: How Citizens United Undermines Our Elections and the Supreme 
Court, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 145 (June 14, 2012), http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/ 
online/money-crisis; Richard L. Hasen, Worse Than Watergate, SLATE (July 19, 2012, 2:55 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2012/07/campaign_finance_after_citi
zens_united_is_worse_than_watergate.html; Bradley A. Smith, The Myth of Campaign Finance 
Reform, NATIONALAFFAIRS (Winter 2010), http://www.nationalaffairs.com/publications/detail/the-
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 7. See, e.g., James Bopp, Jr. et al., The Game Changer: Citizens United’s Impact on Campaign 
Finance Law in General and Corporate Political Speech in Particular, 9 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 251 
(2010); Richard Briffault, Corporations, Corruption, and Complexity: Campaign Finance After 
Citizens United, 20 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 643 (2011). 
 8. See Am. Tradition P’ship, Inc. v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490 (2012) (rejecting Montana’s ban 
on independent expenditures without hearing oral argument, signaling the Court’s unwillingness to 
reconsider the holding in Citizens United). 
 9. Although Citizens United is the best known case, another case, Speech Now v. FEC was 
responsible for creating the much derided “SuperPACs.” See SpeechNow.org v. Fed. Election 
Comm’n, 599 F.3d 686, 689 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 553 (2010). 
 10. See PEW RESEARCH CTR., THE PEOPLE AND THEIR GOVERNMENT: DISTRUST, 
DISCONTENT, ANGER AND PARTISAN RANCOR (2010), available at http://www.people-
press.org/files/legacy-pdf/606.pdf. 
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While it is true that “session freeze”
11
 statutes are unlikely to reduce 
the overall amount of money spent in elections, they do create a bright-
line delineation between the two roles of an elected official: campaigning 
and governing. State legislatures have found session freezes to be an ef-
fective way to combat corruption and the appearance of corruption in 
state legislatures.
12
 With the traditional methods of regulating campaign 
finance becoming harder to utilize, the federal government should con-
sider emulating these state laws to help restore faith in government.
13
 
Different forms of session freeze statutes have been utilized by different 
states, and an examination of these statutes and the cases interpreting 
them demonstrates that there is a clear way to formulate a federal law 
that would function within the bounds of the precedent set by Citizens 
United. Accordingly, Congress should implement a law that would pre-
vent currently sitting federal elected officials from accepting campaign 
contributions from lobbyists and lobbyists’ employers while Congress is 
in session. 
Part II of this Comment provides a brief background of the law un-
derpinning all campaign finance restrictions, and examines the structure 
of state session freeze statutes and the outcomes of challenges to these 
statutes. Part III suggests a specific proposal for a federal version of a 
session freeze. Part IV addresses critiques of the proposal and examines 
the issues it would face if challenged in court, but still argues that the 
proposal would be constitutional and effective in addressing campaign 
finance reform. Part V concludes. 
II. FEDERAL CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAW AND STATE SESSION FREEZE 
STATUTES 
Campaign finance law is regulated at both the federal and state lev-
el. Although federal races are regulated through federal law and state 
races are regulated through state law, both laws must still meet the stand-
                                                          
 11. A “session freeze” statute is one that places temporal restrictions on when a campaign for 
state office can accept contributions. These laws restrict the acceptance of contributions during the 
legislative session, hence the term session freeze.  See, e.g., WASH. STATE PUBLIC DISCLOSURE 
COMMISSION, REGULAR SESSION FREEZE STARTS ON DECEMBER 15, 2012 (2012), available at 
http://web.pdc.wa.gov/archive/guide/brochures/pdf/2012/Freeze.2013.pdf. 
 12. See, e.g., N.C. Right to Life, Inc. v. Bartlett, 168 F.3d 705, 715 (4th Cir. 1999). 
 13. Congress’s approval rating tied the all-time low in August 2012. See Frank Newport, Con-
gress Approval Ties All-Time Low at 10%, GALLUP POLITICS (Aug. 14, 2012), 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/156662/Congress-Approval-Ties-Time-Low.aspx. Although Congress’s 
approval rating rebounded slightly in early 2013, it is still only at 15%. See Frank Newport, Con-
gress Approval Holding Steady at 15%, GALLUP POLITICS (Feb. 19, 2013), 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/160625/congress-approval-holding-steady.aspx. 
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ards set by the First Amendment of the United States Constitution.
14
  
Additionally, the United States Supreme Court has concluded that for the 
purposes of free speech in the political arena, money and actual speech 
are functionally identical,
15
 and as such, spending money on political 
campaigns is protected under the First Amendment. 
A. An Overview of Federal Campaign Finance Law 
A brief glimpse of the development of modern campaign law is 
necessary to understand why Citizens United represents such a departure 
from past campaign finance jurisprudence. In 1971, Congress enacted the 
Federal Elections Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA).
16
 Following reports of 
serious financial abuses in the 1972 Presidential election,
17
 Congress 
made substantial amendments to FECA in 1974, including limiting cam-
paign contributions for federal office,
18
 limiting expenditures by candi-
dates and their committees,
19
 limiting independent expenditures,
20
 requir-
ing disclosure of political contributions,
21
 and providing for the public 
financing of presidential campaigns.
22
 A lawsuit was filed challenging 
these amendments, and the Supreme Court decided the landmark cam-
paign finance case Buckley v. Valeo in 1976.
23
 The Court in Buckley 
made a number of groundbreaking decisions. First, it upheld public fi-
nancing for presidential campaigns.
24
 Second, the decision held that both 
campaign contributions and expenditures are protected under the First 
Amendment.
25
 Finally, it created different levels of scrutiny for contribu-
tion limitations and expenditure limitations on the grounds that re-
strictions on expenditures “necessarily reduces the quantity of expres-
sion”
26
 while contribution limits entail “only a marginal restriction”
27
 on 
                                                          
 14. “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech . . . . ” U.S. CONST. 
amend. I. 
 15. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n 558 U.S. 310, 316 (2010); Buckley v. Valeo, 
424 U.S. 1(1976). 
 16. Formerly 18 U.S.C. § 608 (1974). 
 17. The FEC and the Federal Campaign Finance Law, FED. ELECTION COMMITTEE, 
http://www.fec.gov/pages/brochures/fecfeca.shtml (last updated Jan. 2013). 
 18. 2 U.S.C § 441a (2002). 
 19. Formerly 18 U.S.C. § 608(c) (1974). 
 20. Formerly 18 U.S.C. § 608(e) (1974). 
 21. 2 U.S.C. § 434 (2007). 
 22. 26 U.S.C. Subt. H (2013). 
 23. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). Although campaign finance law has undergone many 
changes since Buckley, the case remains good law and is applied in virtually every campaign finance 
case. 
 24. Id. at 85. 
 25. Id. at 14. 
 26. Id. at 19. 
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the contributor’s ability to speak. In other words, limitations on some-
one’s ability to spend money to share their opinions is too close to a limi-
tation on an individual’s actual right to speak, while limitations on some-
one’s right to contribute money does not unduly restrict a person’s ability 
to engage in the symbolic act of contributing to a campaign.
28
 Limita-
tions on expenditures were subject to strict scrutiny, while limitations on 




This is not to say, however, that the Supreme Court has always 
been as hostile to the regulation of campaign finance as it is today. The 
Supreme Court has upheld restrictions on campaign spending in two key 
cases in the last twenty years. Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce 
was the first key case, decided in 1990.
30
 At issue in Austin was a Michi-
gan law that banned the use of corporate treasury funds in independent 
expenditures.
31
 The Court applied strict scrutiny and created a new com-
pelling government interest in preventing the distorting effect of general 
treasury dollars on political campaigns.
32
 The second case, McConnell v. 
FEC,
33
 decided in 2003, upheld a federal law banning political parties 
from soliciting or accepting
34
 so-called “soft money”—money donated to 
political parties used to influence elections.
35
 
However, this period of greater acceptance of regulation on cam-
paign finance law was short-lived: both Austin and McConnell were ex-
pressly overruled in 2010 by Citizens United v. FEC.
36
 In Citizens Unit-
ed, the Supreme Court overturned a federal law barring the use of corpo-
                                                                                                                                  
 27. Id. at 20. 
 28. A later United States Supreme Court case, Randall v. Sorrell, held that campaign contribu-
tion limits can be unconstitutional if they are so low that they serve to stifle speech. See Randall v. 
Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 261 (2006). 
 29. Although Buckley is credited with creating the “exacting scrutiny” standard of review, the 
“exacting scrutiny” standard of review is better explained in Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government 
PAC: “Thus, under Buckley’s standard of scrutiny, a contribution limit involving ‘significant inter-
ference’ with associational rights, could survive if the Government demonstrated that contribution 
regulation was ‘closely drawn’ to match a ‘sufficiently important interest.’” 528 U.S. 377, 387–88 
(2000). 
 30. Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 654 (1990), overruled by Citizens 
United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 31. Id. at 654. 
 32. Id. at 666. 
 33. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 108 (2003), overruled by Citizens Unit-
ed v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 34. The McConnell Court reviewed the law under exacting scrutiny, noting that the law in 
question is a contribution limitation. See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 108. 
 35. Id. at 95. 
 36. Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310. 
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rate treasury money for political campaigns.
37
 Citizens United further 
held that the only sufficient government interest in regulating contribu-
tions or expenditures was to combat quid pro quo corruption,
38
 or the 
appearance of quid pro quo corruption.
39
 Moreover, shortly after the Su-
preme Court’s decision in Citizens United, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia struck down all contribution limita-
tions on independent expenditures and independent expenditure commit-
tees in the case Speechnow.org v. FEC.
40
 The decision—premised on 
Citizens United— held that any contribution limitations on independent 
expenditure committees is unconstitutional because there is no risk of 
quid pro quo corruption in these situations since independent expenditure 
committees cannot donate directly to candidates.
41
 Prior to Speech-
now.org, independent expenditure committees had strict limitations on 
the amount of money they could accept from a single donor.
42
 The deci-
sion in Speechnow.org gave rise to what are now known as Super 
PACs,
43
 which can raise and spend unlimited amounts of money provid-
ed that they do not donate or directly coordinate with candidate commit-
tees.
44
 These recent decisions by the Supreme Court have led some legal 
commentators to conclude that disclosure may be the only restriction 
favored by the current Supreme Court.
45
  
Thus, current case law holds that any restrictions on expenditures 
are unconstitutional unless they are narrowly tailored to serve the com-
pelling purpose of removing quid pro quo corruption or the appearance 
                                                          
 37. Id. at 365. 
 38. “Quid-pro-quo corruption” occurs when a politician accepts a contribution from a donor for 
the express purpose of changing his position on an issue. This is a much narrower construction of 
corruption previously accepted by the Court in McConnell, which held that corruption could include 
the use of money to buy access to elected officials. See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 96. 
 39. Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310. For a more in-depth look at the holding and possible effects 
of Citizens United see Michael S. Kang, After Citizens United, 44 IND. L. REV. 243 (2010). Addition-
ally, “leveling the playing field” has been rejected as a legitimate government interest since the 
Court’s decision in Buckley. This was reaffirmed in 2008 in Davis v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 554 
U.S. 724, 741–42 (2008). 
 40. SpeechNow.org v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 599 F.3d 686, 689 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. de-
nied, 131 S. Ct. 553 (U.S. 2010). 
 41. Id. at 695. 
 42. Id. 
 43. For a more in-depth discussion of Super PACs, see Richard Briffault, Super Pacs, 96 
MINN. L. REV. 1644 (2012). 
 44. Super PACs spent over $609 million in the 2012 election cycle. Ctr. for Responsive Poli-
tics, Super PACs, OPENSECRETS, http://www.opensecrets.org/pacs/superpacs.php (last updated June 
12, 2013). 
 45. See Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Has the Tide Turned in Favor of Disclosure? Revealing Money 
in Politics After Citizens United and Doe v. Reed, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1057 (2011). 
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of quid pro quo corruption.
46
 Furthermore, restrictions on contributions 
are upheld only when they serve a sufficiently important government 
interest and are closely drawn to serve that interest.
47
 Although campaign 
finance disclosure also must meet the exacting scrutiny standard, most 
disclosure laws have met this bar when challenged.
48
 The current state of 
the law raises the question: What options are left to those who wish for 
greater regulation of campaign finance? 
B. Structure of State Session Freeze Statutes 
A total of twenty-five states have some sort of ban on contributions 
to elected officials while the state legislatures are in session.
49
 Twelve 
different session freeze statutes have been challenged in various courts, 
with mixed results. Session freeze statutes have been upheld in four cas-
es,
50
 and overturned in eight.
51
 Additionally, session freeze statutes ap-
pear to be popular given that in all but one of the states where the law 
was struck down the legislature later enacted an additional statute or reg-
ulation to restrict contributions during the legislative session.
52
 Although 
courts have agreed—in all cases considering session freeze laws—that 
the purpose of these statutes is to fight corruption or the appearance of 
corruption, the holdings in these cases diverge drastically on whether the 
                                                          
 46. Thus far, the Supreme Court has struck down almost all expenditure limits. For candidates, 
see Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 52 (1976); for campaigns, see Buckley, 424 U.S. at 51; and for 
corporations, see Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 364 (2010). 
 47. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25. 
 48. Torres-Spelliscy, supra note 45. 
 49. Fifteen states (Alabama, Alaska, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Louisiana, Maryland, Nevada, 
New Mexico, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin) have total bans on 
contributions to sitting elected officials during the legislative session. Ten states (Arizona, Colorado, 
Connecticut, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Minnesota, North Carolina, Oklahoma, and Vermont) have par-
tial bans that are limited to lobbyists and/or PACs. Limits on Campaign Contributions During the 
Legislative Session, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES,  http://www.ncsl.org/legislatures-
elections/elections/limits-on-contributions-during-session.aspx (last visited Aug. 30, 2013).. 
 50. See N.C. Right to Life, Inc. v. Bartlett, 168 F.3d 705, 708 (4th Cir. 1999); Yamada v. 
Weaver, 872 F. Supp. 2d 1023 (D. Haw. 2012); Inst. of Governmental Advocates v. Fair Political 
Practices Comm’n, 164 F. Supp. 2d 1183, 1190 (E.D. Cal. 2001); Kimbell v. Hooper, 665 A.2d 44, 
45 (Vt. 1995). 
 51. See Green Party of Conn. v. Garfield, 616 F.3d 189, 192 (2d Cir. 2010); Ark. Right to Life 
State Political Action Comm. v. Butler, 29 F. Supp. 2d 540, 550 (W.D. Ark. 1998); Emison v. Cata-
lano, 951 F. Supp. 714, 716 (E.D. Tenn. 1996); Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC v. Maupin, 922 F. Supp. 
1413, 1414 (E.D. Mo. 1996); Dallman v. Ritter, 225 P.3d 610, 615 (Colo. 2010); Casino Ass’n of 
La. v. State 820 So. 2d 494, 495 (La. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1226 (2003); State v. Alaska 
Civil Liberties Union, 978 P.2d 597, 600 (Alaska 1999); State v. Dodd, 561 So. 2d 263 (Fla. 1990). 
 52. For example, Missouri enacted another session freeze statute that was subsequently struck 
down. See Trout v. State, 231 S.W.3d 140, 148 (Mo. 2007). 
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statutes are properly constructed to achieve this aim.
53
 Furthermore, alt-
hough more of these statutes have been struck down than upheld,
54
 a 
close examination of the cases demonstrates that there is a constitutional 
way to construct a session freeze statute. Of the twenty-five states with 
session freeze statutes, fifteen have a total ban on the acceptance of con-
tributions during the legislative session.
55
 The remaining ten states have 




Session freeze statutes are comprised of four basic components and 
can generally be separated into two broad categories. These statutes are 
comprised of four basic components: first, a delineation of what offices 
are affected by the freeze; second, whether the law applies to incumbents 
alone or includes challengers; third, an express timeframe for the re-
striction; and finally, whether any contributions are permissible or if all 
are banned. In addition, session freeze laws can be separated into two 
broad categories: those laws that restrict all contributions during the leg-
islative session and those that only restrict contributions by certain indi-
viduals. The next two sections of this Comment will examine each of 
these categories, starting with states that have a blanket ban on contribu-
tions to legislators during the legislative session. 
1. Blanket Restrictions on Contributions During Session. 
Fifteen states restrict all contributions during the legislative session, 
regardless of the identity of the giver.
57
 However, these states are divided 
on whom the session freeze affects. Six states have bans that affect all 
state elected officials, including those whose duties are not predominant-
ly legislative, for example, the comptroller and the attorney general.
58
 
Nevada is alone in having its session freeze law apply to the legislature, 
governor, and lieutenant governor,
59
 perhaps reflecting the role of the 
                                                          
 53. See, e.g., Green Party of Conn., 616 F.3d at 192; Teper v. Miller, 82 F.3d 989 (11th Cir. 
1996); Inst. of Governmental Advocates, 164 F. Supp. 2d 1183; Emison, 951 F. Supp. at 716; Win-
borne v. Easley, 523 S.E.2d 149 (N.C. Ct. App. 1999); Kimbell, 665 A.2d at 44. 
 54. A total of seven cases have directly challenged session freeze statutes. Of those seven, the 
statutes were upheld in two and overturned in five. For an in-depth discussion of these cases, see 
infra Part II. 
 55. See the fifteen state list, supra note 49. 
 56. See the fifteen state list, supra note 49. 
 57. See supra note 49. 
 58. Alabama, ALA. CODE § 17-5-7(b)(2) (2013); Maryland, MD. CODE ANN. ELEC. LAW § 13-
235 (West 2013); Texas, TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 253.034 (West 2013); Texas Ethics Commission 
Rule § 22.11; Virginia, VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-954 (2013); Washington, WASH. REV. CODE 
§ 42.17A.560 (2013); Wisconsin, WIS. STAT. § 13.625 (2013). 
 59. NEV. REV. STAT. § 294A.300 (2011). 
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lieutenant governor as the president of the senate.
60
 Three states apply 
their session freeze laws to only the legislature and the governor,
61
 and 
some of these statutes name a different freeze period for the governor, 
which is directly linked to the veto period for bills.
62
 The session freeze 
laws in the remaining five states only affect the legislature.
63
 
However, there is less variation in whether the laws affect both in-
cumbents and challengers. Only three of the fifteen states have laws that 
affect challengers and incumbents equally.
64
 Of the remaining twelve 
states, eleven restrict donations to incumbents,
65
 and one state—New 
Mexico—restricts contributions to both challenger and incumbent candi-




In general, most session freeze laws only apply during the legisla-
tive session.
67
 Three states have bans that begin before the legislative 
session starts and end after the legislative session ends.
68
 Two states have 
bans that begin before the session starts, but end as soon as session clos-
es.
69
 Finally, Wisconsin is an outlier in that it does not just ban contribu-
tions during the legislative session, but it bans all contributions at all 




                                                          
 60. NEV. CONST. ART. V, § 17. 
 61. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 1-19-34.1 (WEST 2013); TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-10-310 (2013); UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 36-11-305 (2012). 
 62. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 1-19-34.1 (WEST 2013); UTAH CODE § 36-11-305 (2012). 
 63. ALASKA STAT. § 24.60.031 (2013); Florida House Rule 15.3(b); Florida Senate Rule 1.361; 
GA. CODE ANN. § 21-5-35 (2013); IND. CODE § 3-9-2-12 (2013); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 18:1505.2(Q) (2012). 
 64. ALA. CODE § 17-5-7(b)(2) (2013); IND. CODE § 3-9-2-12 (2013); WIS. STAT. § 13.625 
(2013). 
 65. ALASKA STAT. § 24.60.031 (2013); Florida House Rule 15.3(b); Florida Senate Rule 1.361; 
GA. CODE ANN § 21-5-35 (2013); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18:1505.2(Q) (2012); MD. CODE ANN. 
ELEC. LAW § 13-235 (WEST 2013); NEV. REV. STAT. § 294A.300 (2011); TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-10-
310 (2013); TEXAS ELEC. CODE ANN. § 253.034 (2013); Texas Ethics Commission Rule § 22.11; 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 36-11-305 (2012); VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-954 (2013); WASH. REV. CODE 
§ 42.17A.560 (2013). 
 66. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 1-19-34.1 (WEST 2013). 
 67. ALA. CODE § 17-5-7(b)(2)(2013); ALASKA STAT. § 24.60.031 (2013); Florida House Rule 
15.3(b); Florida Senate Rule 1.361; GA. CODE ANN § 21-5-35 (2013); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 18:1505.2(Q) (2012); MD. CODE ANN. ELEC. LAW § 13-235 (WEST 2013); VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-
954 (2013); UTAH CODE ANN. § 36-11-305 (2012). 
 68. NEV. REV. STAT. § 294A.300 (2011); TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 253.034 (West 2013); 
Texas Ethics Commission Rule § 22.11; WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17A.560 (2013). 
 69. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 1-19-34.1 (West 2013); TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-10-310 (2013). 
 70. WIS. STAT. § 13.625 (2013). 
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Thus, the most blanket restriction session freeze laws affect both 
the legislature and the governor, affect only currently sitting elected offi-
cials, and apply only during the duration of the legislative session. 
2. Identity-Based Restrictions on Contributions During Session 
Identity-based
71
 session freeze laws share a great deal in common 
with total contribution bans.
72
 Like the session freeze laws discussed 
above, identity-based bans vary depending on which elected officials are 
affected, whether the law affects only incumbents or includes challeng-
ers, and the duration that the bans are in effect. The only major differ-
ence is that identity-based bans only bar certain individuals from donat-
ing during the prohibited time period. 
States are split as to which elected officials are affected by identity-
based session freeze laws. Four states have their session freeze affect all 
elected state officials.
73
 Two states restrict contributions to the governor 
and the legislature,
74
 and the remaining four states only restrict contribu-
tions to the legislature.
75
 The majority of identity-based restrictions apply 
to both incumbents and challengers,
76
 with just three states restricting 
their session freeze to incumbent officials.
77
 Additionally, most identity-
based session freeze laws apply during the legislative session, with an 
extended application for the governor during the veto period after the 
legislative session ends.
78
 Only Kansas has a blackout period that starts 
before the legislative session begins.
79
 
                                                          
 71. It is worth noting here that a number of states and the federal government have identity-
based blanket bans on contributions for some groups, most commonly lobbyists or government 
contractors. See, e.g., 2 U.S.C. § 441c(a)(1)-(2) (2013); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 9-610(e) (2013); CAL. 
GOV’T CODE § 85702 (West 2013); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6.767 (West 2012); S.C. CODE ANN. § 2-
17-80 (2012). 
 72. See supra note 49. 
 73. COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-45-105.5 (2012); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 9-610(e) (2013); IOWA CODE 
§ 68A.504 (2013); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 25-4153a (2012). 
 74. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1234.01 (2013); ME. REV. STAT. 1 § 1015(3) (2013). 
 75. MINN. STAT. § 10A.273 (2013); OKLA. STAT. 21 § 187.1 (2013); Oklahoma Ethics Com-
mission Rules § 257:10-1-6; VT. STAT. ANN. 2 § 266(3) (2013). 
 76. COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-45-105.5 (2012); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 9-610(e) (2013); IOWA CODE 
§ 68A.504 (2013); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 25-4153a (2012); MINN. STAT. § 10A.273 (2013); OKLA. 
STAT. 21 § 187.1 (2013); Oklahoma Ethics Commission Rules § 257:10-1-6. 
 77. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1234.01 (2013); ME. REV. STAT. 1 § 1015(3) (2013); VT. 
STAT. ANN. 2 § 266(3) (2013); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-278.13b (WEST 2013). 
 78. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1234.01 (2013); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 9-610 (2013); COLO. 
REV. STAT. § 1-45-105.5 (2012); IOWA CODE § 68A.504 (2013); ME. REV. STAT. 1 § 1015(3) (2013); 
MINN. STAT. § 10A.273 (2013); VT. STAT. ANN. 2 § 266(3) (2013); OKLA. STAT. 21 § 187.1 (2013); 
Oklahoma Ethics Commission Rules § 257:10-1-6. 
 79. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 25-4153a (2012). 
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The hallmark of an identity-based ban is when specific individuals 
are prohibited from donating during session. The identities of those pro-
hibited from contributing to campaigns during session range from the 
most prohibitive, which bar any non-individual person from contributing 
during the freeze,
80
 to less expansive bans, such as bans on lobbyists and 
Political Action Committees (PACs),
81
 and bans on lobbyists and their 
employers.
82
 Additionally, Wisconsin, which has a total ban during the 
legislative session on all contributions, also bars contributions from reg-
istered lobbyists at any time.
83
 
Indeed, based on the aggregate of all these states’ statutes, the 
standard identity-based session freeze law would affect all state elected 
officials, apply to both incumbents and challengers, only apply during 
the exact duration of the legislative session, and only apply to registered 
lobbyists and those who employ them. 
C. Challenges to State Session Freeze Laws 
While a total of twenty-four
84
 states have some form of a session 
freeze law currently on the books, these laws have been challenged a 
whopping total of seven times. Furthermore, although these challenges 
have been generally successful, a close reading of the cases demonstrates 
that there are certain characteristics that courts find problematic, particu-
larly how tailored the law is to the accepted government interest of 
fighting corruption. 
First, it is important to note that every case that has interpreted a 
session freeze statute has reiterated the long-held concept that combating 
corruption or the appearance of corruption is a compelling state inter-
est.
85
 The strength of this government interest has been long recognized
86
 
                                                          
 80. Id. Kansas also has an express ban on lobbyists and Political Action Committees from 
contributing at any time, not just during the legislative session. Id. 
 81. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 9-610(e) (2013); IOWA CODE § 68A.504 (2013); MINN. STAT. 
§ 10A.273 (2013). 
 82. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1234.01 (2013); COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-45-105.5 (2012); ME. 
REV. STAT. 1 § 1015(3) (2013); OKLA. STAT. 21 § 187.1 (2013); Oklahoma Ethics Commission 
Rules § 257:10-1-6; VT. STAT. ANN. 2 § 266(3) (2013). 
 83. WIS. STAT. § 13.625 (2013). 
 84. Four other states, California, Illinois, Kentucky, and South Carolina, have total bans on 
lobbyist contributions, regardless of time of year. See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 85702 (West 2013); 5 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. 430 / 5-40 (West 2013); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6.767 (West 2012); S.C. CODE ANN. 
§ 2-17-80 (2012). 
 85. N.C. Right to Life, Inc. v. Bartlett, 168 F.3d 705, 715–16 (4th Cir. 1999); Emison v. Cata-
lano, 951 F. Supp. 714, 723 (E.D. Tenn. 1996); Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC v. Maupin, 922 F. Supp. 
1413, 1420 (E.D. Mo. 1996); State v. Alaska Civil Liberties Union, 978 P.2d 597, 630 (Alaska 
1999); Kimbell v. Hooper, 665 A.2d 44, 51 (Vt. 1995); State v. Dodd, 561 So. 2d 263, 265 (Fla. 
1990). 
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and was affirmed in Citizens United.
87
 Second, it is also important to 
note the courts’ divergence on which standard of review should be ap-
plied to session freeze statutes. Although Buckley established that contri-
bution limits are to be governed by the slightly less-deferential exacting 
scrutiny standard,
88
 most courts have actually chosen to apply strict scru-
tiny.
89
 These courts appear to be applying strict scrutiny because they 
believe that the kind of restriction on associational or speech freedoms 
represented by a ban on contributions, even one that is temporary in na-
ture, must meet that higher bar.
90
 To date, six of the seven courts to ex-
amine session freeze laws have applied strict scrutiny.
91
 The remaining 
court appropriately applied exacting scrutiny, noting that Buckley ex-
pressly held that contribution limits are a lesser restriction on speech and 
associational freedoms than expenditure limits.
92
 
The standard of review question is critical in campaign finance cas-
es, as it is in most cases that analyze constitutional rights. Of the six cas-
es that have examined session freeze laws under strict scrutiny, only 
one
93
 has upheld the statute at issue. Conversely, the only court to apply 
the exacting scrutiny analysis upheld the session freeze law.
94
 That being 
said, the court’s choice of a standard of review cannot be regarded as 
wholly dispositive of the outcome in these cases; other factors, such as 
whether the laws affected both challengers and incumbents, must also be 
considered. The following subsections of this Comment will focus on the 
aforementioned seven cases, their outcomes, and which factors appear to 
have controlled the courts’ analysis. 
                                                                                                                                  
 86. This interest was cited with strong approval in Buckley. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26 
(1976). 
 87. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 357 (2010). 
 88. See supra note 29. 
 89. See, e.g., N.C. Right to Life, 168 F.3d at 715; Ark. Right to Life State Political Action 
Comm. v. Butler, 29 F. Supp. 2d 540, 553 (W.D. Ark. 1998); Emison, 951 F. Supp. at 723; Dodd, 
561 So. 2d 263. 
 90. See, e.g., Dodd, 561 So. 2d at 264 (“As a result, we believe the present case involves 
weighty free speech and associational rights protected both by federal and Florida constitutional law. 
Any restrictions the state imposes on the conduct in question must be narrowly tailored to serve a 
compelling state interest.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 91. N.C. Right to Life, 168 F.3d at 715; Emison, 951 F. Supp. at 723; Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC v. 
Maupin, 922 F. Supp. 1413, 1420 (E.D. Mo. 1996); State v. Alaska Civil Liberties Union, 978 P.2d 
597, 630 (Alaska 1999); Dodd, 561 So. 2d at 264. 
 92. Kimbell v. Hooper, 665 A.2d 44, 51 (Vt. 1995). 
 93. N.C. Right to Life, 168 F.3d at 717. 
 94. Kimbell, 665 A.2d at 51. 
2013] State Session Freeze Laws 267 
1. Overturned Session Freeze Laws 
All six of the session freeze laws that were overturned were deemed 
unconstitutional because they were overinclusive, underinclusive, or 
both.
95
 Additionally, these cases shared two other key similarities: first, 
the courts applied strict scrutiny,
96
 and second, each court agreed that the 
government had a legitimate state interest in the prevention of corruption 
or the appearance of corruption with a session freeze statute.
97
 The 
courts’ approval of the use of session freeze laws to combat corruption 
and the appearance of corruption is critical because this is the only legit-
imate government interest sanctioned by Citizens United.
98
 
It is necessary to look at the construction of the specific session 
freeze statutes in order to understand what distinguishes those that were 
upheld from those that were overturned. Four of the five challenged stat-
utes encompassed both incumbents and challengers seeking office.
99
 Ar-
kansas Right to Life State Political Action Committee v. Butler (ARTL), 
the only case that struck down a statute that applied to only incumbents, 
relied heavily on one of the cases that struck down a law that applied to 
both challengers and incumbents.
100
 This distinction is critical because 
each of the courts focused on the overbroad nature of the statute when 
discussing why the statute was unconstitutional.
101
 
For example, in Emison v. Catalano, the Tennessee Supreme Court 
focused heavily on the argument that the inclusion of non-incumbents 
drastically reduced the government’s anti-corruption interest.
102
 The 
court held that the session freeze law, “although inspired by the com-
mendable impulse to eliminate corruption and the appearance of corrup-
tion in political life, cannot constitutionally be applied to contributions to 
non-incumbent candidates for seats in the legislature.”
103
 Furthermore, 
when discussing whether the law was narrowly tailored, the court held 
that black-out provisions, like the one challenged, did not provide the 
                                                          
 95. Ark. Right to Life State Political Action Comm. v. Butler, 29 F. Supp. 2d 540, 552 (W.D. 
Ark. 1998); Emison, 951 F. Supp. at 723; Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 922 F. Supp. at 1421–22; Alaska 
Civil Liberties Union, 978 P.2d at 631; Dodd, 561 So. 2d at 265–66. 
 96. Ark. Right to Life State Political Action Comm., 29 F. Supp. 2d at 551; Emison, 951 F. 
Supp. at 723; Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 922 F. Supp. at 1420; Alaska Civil Liberties Union, 978 P.2d 
at 631; Dodd, 561 So. 2d at 264. 
 97. See cases cited supra note 85. 
 98. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 357 (2010). 
 99. Emison, 951 F. Supp. at 716–17; Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 922 F. Supp. at 1414; Alaska Civil 
Liberties Union, 978 P.2d at 630; Dodd, 561 So. 2d at 263–64. 
 100. Ark. Right to Life State Political Action Comm., 29 F. Supp. 2d at 550–52. 
 101. See cases cited supra note 95. 
 102. Emison, 951 F. Supp. at 723. 
 103. Id. 
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least intrusive means of achieving the elimination of political corruption. 
The court held that this method deprived non-incumbents, who are not 
subject to corrupting quid pro quo arrangements in the same way as are 
sitting legislators, of any means to counterbalance incumbents’ ad-
vantage of “virtually unlimited access to the press and free publicity 
merely by virtue of the public forum they are privileged to occupy.”
104
 




Other courts emphasized the underinclusive nature of the session 
freeze laws in their decisions to overturn the statutes while still agreeing 
that the inclusion of challengers was a serious problem. For example, the 
court in State v. Dodd was concerned with other factors it felt rendered 
the law as both over and underinclusive.
106
 Like the courts in Tennessee 
and Alaska, the Dodd court agreed that the inclusion of non-incumbent 
challengers weakened the state’s anti-corruption interest.
107
 The court 
further held that the statute’s inclusion of special sessions of the legisla-
ture in the ban, which could occur at any time and last an unknown dura-
tion, represented a serious constraint on fundraising.
108
 Moreover, the 
court felt that the name recognition and contacts within the community 
enjoyed by incumbents rendered them able to handle a session freeze 
better than challengers, placing challengers at a serious disadvantage.
109
 
Finally, the Dodd court found the statute to be underinclusive because 
the statute ignored the fact that potentially corrupting contributions could 
be made when the legislature was not in session.
110
 
Similarly, the courts in ARTL and Shrink Missouri Gov’t PAC v. 
Maupin (Shrink Mo.) were also concerned about the underinclusive na-
ture of the statutes because a corrupting contribution could happen at any 
time.
111
 The ARTL and Shrink Mo. courts differ from the courts in Dodd, 
Alaska Civil Liberties Union, and Emison, however, because they ex-
pressly found their respective session freeze laws overbroad on the 
grounds that small contributions have no corrupting effect.
112
 The court 
in Shrink Mo. further determined that while combating corruption and 
                                                          
 104. Id. 
 105. State v. Alaska Civil Liberties Union, 978 P.2d 597, 631 (Alaska 1999). 
 106. State v. Dodd, 561 So. 2d 263, 265–66 (Fla. 1990). 
 107. Id. at 265. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 265–66. 
 111. Ark. Right to Life State Political Action Comm. v. Butler, 29 F. Supp. 2d 540, 552 (W.D. 
Ark. 1998); Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC v. Maupin, 922 F. Supp. 1413, 1422 (E.D. Mo. 1996). 
 112. Ark. Right to Life State Political Action Comm., 29 F. Supp. 2d at 552; Shrink Mo. Gov’t 
PAC, 922 F. Supp. at 1421. 
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the appearance of corruption is a compelling government interest, the 
state had not demonstrated enough concrete proof that any corruption or 
appearance of corruption had occurred.
113
   
Although an important decision, ARTL is an outlier because the 
statute in this case only applied to incumbents.
114
 Although the court in 
ARTL relied on many of the same arguments advanced in Shrink Mo.,
115
 
the court failed to distinguish the key characteristic that the law only ap-
plied to incumbents. Furthermore, the court in ARTL also relied heavily 
on the district court’s opinion in North Carolina Right to Life, Inc. v. 
Bartlett, which was later reversed by the Fourth Circuit.
116
 Accordingly, 
the outcome in ARTL is questionable. 
Consequently, courts tend to overturn session freeze statutes when 
the laws are insufficiently tailored to meet the compelling government 
interest of combating corruption. Statutes are overinclusive when they 
include challengers who have no ability to directly affect legislation 
while they are campaigning.
117
 Additionally, a few courts found that 
these statutes were underinclusive because a corrupting contribution 
could occur at any time, not just during the legislative session.
118
 Finally, 
the fact that each of these courts utilized strict scrutiny review
119
 must be 
considered in the overall analysis.
120
 
2. Upheld Session Freeze Laws 
Because only two courts have found session freeze laws to be con-
stitutional, it is harder to draw any broad-based conclusions. However, 
these two cases do share a few key characteristics. First, like the cases in 
Part II.C.1,
121
 both courts agreed that the state had a compelling interest 
in combating corruption and the appearance of corruption.
122
 Second, 
                                                          
 113. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 922 F. Supp. at 1421. 
 114. Ark. Right to Life State Political Action Comm., 29 F. Supp. 2d at 552. 
 115. In fact, large portions of the case are direct quotes to Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC. 
 116. N.C. Right to Life, Inc. v. Bartlett, 168 F.3d 705, 716–17 (4th Cir. 1999). 
 117. See cases cited supra note 95. 
 118. State v. Dodd, 561 So. 2d 263, 265–66 (Fla. 1990). 
 119. See cases cited supra note 96. 
 120. The problems with applying strict scrutiny review to session freeze laws will be discussed 
in more detail infra Part IV.A. 
 121. Ark. Right to Life State Political Action Comm. v. Butler, 29 F. Supp. 2d 540, 552 (W.D. 
Ark. 1998); Emison v. Catalano, 951 F. Supp. 714, 723 (E.D. Tenn. 1996); Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC 
v. Maupin, 922 F. Supp. 1413, 1421–22 (E.D. Mo. 1996); State v. Alaska Civil Liberties Union, 978 
P.2d 597, 631 (Alaska 1999); Dodd, 561 So. 2d at 265–66. 
 122. N.C. Right to Life, Inc. v. Bartlett, 168 F.3d 705, 716–17 (4th Cir. 1999); Kimbell v. 
Hooper, 665 A.2d 44, 51 (Vt. 1995). 
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unlike the cases in Part II.C.1,
123
 both courts found the session freeze 
laws in question to be suitably tailored to achieve this compelling inter-
est.
124
 However, unlike session freeze laws that have been overturned, 
there is a split on which standard of review is used by the courts. One of 
the two cases applied strict scrutiny
125




The first case, North Carolina Right to Life, Inc. v. Bartlett 
(NCRTL),
127
 is the only case to apply strict scrutiny to a session freeze 
law and find the statute constitutional.
128
 This in and of itself is not re-
markable because the statute has a key attribute that renders it far more 
narrowly tailored than the statutes discussed above. The statute at issue 
in NCRTL was an identity-based ban,
129
 unlike the total bans discussed 
above. North Carolina’s statute established an absolute ban during ses-
sion on the acceptance and solicitation of contributions to both incum-




North Carolina’s statute has a number of factors that render the law 
narrower than the total bans discussed above. It applies only to members 
of the legislature and the lobbyists who have day-to-day interactions with 
them during the legislative session.
131
 The court in NCRTL held that this 
factor demonstrated the compelling nature of the government’s anti-
corruption interest.
132
 Furthermore, the court stated that “[i]f lobbyists 
are free to contribute to legislators while pet projects sit before them, the 
temptation to exchange ‘dollars for political favors’ can be powerful.”
133
 
Additionally, the court cited evidence of actual corruption through pay-
                                                          
 123. Ark. Right to Life State Political Action Comm., 29 F. Supp. 2d at 552; Emison, 951 F. 
Supp. at 723; Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 922 F. Supp. at 1421–22; Alaska Civil Liberties Union, 978 
P.2d at 631; Dodd, 561 So. 2d at 265–66. 
 124. N.C. Right to Life, 168 F.3d at 716; Kimbell, 665 A.2d at 51. 
 125. N.C. Right to Life, 168 F.3d at 715. 
 126. Kimbell, 665 A.2d at 50. 
 127. The case cited here is the Fourth Circuit opinion that found the statute to be constitutional, 
reversing the district court opinion mentioned above. 
 128. N.C. Right to Life, 168 F.3d at 715. 
 129. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 163-278.13B(c) (West 2013). 
 130. Id.; N.C. Right to Life, 168 F.3d at 714. 
 131. “While the General Assembly is in regular session, no limited contributee or the real or 
purported agent of a limited contributee shall: (1) Solicit a contribution from a limited contributor to 
be made to that limited contributee or to be made to any other candidate, officeholder, or political 
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 132. N.C. Right to Life, 168 F.3d at 715–16. 
 133. Id. 
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to-play scandals in other states
134
 and noted that there did not need to be 
any proof of actual corruption in North Carolina because “[t]he First 
Amendment does not prevent states . . . from recognizing these dangers 
and taking reasonable steps to ensure that the appearance of corruption 




The court in NCRTL found the statute to be narrowly tailored be-
cause the statute only restricted contributions by lobbyists and PACs and 
the law was limited to the time when corruption issues were most likely 
to occur.
136
 First, the court found a direct link with the anti-corruption 
interest because the restrictions were focused on only lobbyists and the 
political committees that employed them, noting that these were the “two 
most ubiquitous and powerful players in the political arena.”
137
 Second, 
the court found that the statute was narrowly tailored to combating cor-
ruption because the limitations did not prohibit all contributions and fo-
cused only on the “period during which the risk of an actual quid pro quo 
or the appearance of one runs highest.”
138
 The court also rejected argu-
ments by the plaintiffs that the statute was overbroad due to its inclusion 
of challengers because challengers cannot vote for legislation and there-
fore could not be corrupted by a donation. However, the court noted that 
a contribution to a challenger could serve as a “powerful [] incentive” to 
an incumbent politician to vote against those who donated to their oppo-
nents, and thus could still lead to corruption.
139
 
Although the NCRTL court employed a similar rationale as did the 
court in Kimbell v. Hooper,
140
 the second case in which a session freeze 
law was upheld, the two statutes involved had important differences. The 
courts also used different standards of review. In Kimbell, the Vermont 
Supreme Court examined a similar statute and reached many of the same 
conclusions as the NCRTL court. The statute in question was even nar-
rower than the North Carolina statue in NCRTL. Like the North Carolina 
statute, the statute in Vermont was an identity-based restriction that 
banned lobbyists and employers of lobbyists from making contributions 
during session.
141
 However, the Vermont statute only affected incumbent 
legislators, allowing contributions to challengers to continue during the 
                                                          
 134. Id. at 716. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. at 715–16. 
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 140. Kimbell v. Hooper, 665 A.2d 44, 51 (Vt. 1995). 
 141. VT. STAT. ANN. 2 § 266(3) (2013). 
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legislative session.
142
 Another key difference was that the court in Kim-
bell properly applied exacting scrutiny, noting that Buckley expressly 
created this standard of review for contribution limitations.
143
 The court 
in Kimbell further held that because the limitations were only temporary 
in nature, the temporal restrictions in the statute were a lesser constraint 
than the dollar values limited in Buckley.
144
 
Beyond the narrower construction of the statute and the different 
standard of review, the court in Kimbell did much of the same analysis 
and reached a similar conclusion as the court in NCRTL. First, the court 
found that the state had a sufficiently important interest in preventing 
corruption or the appearance of corruption.
145
 Second, the court found the 
statute to be closely drawn because “the limited prohibition focuses on a 
narrow period during which legislators could be, or could appear to be, 
pressured, coerced, or tempted into voting on the basis of cash contribu-
tions rather than on consideration of the public weal.”
146
 
Although only two courts have considered this issue, both courts 
upheld their state’s session freeze statute for similar reasons. Therefore, 
it appears that courts will uphold session freeze statutes when they are 
based on both the identity of the contributor and restricted to only mem-
bers of the legislature because these limitations render the statutes 
properly tailored to the government interest of preventing corruption.
147
 
While there is a split as to the applicable standard of review, it is clear 
that session freeze laws can meet both the lower exacting scrutiny as well 
as the higher strict scrutiny. 
III. A FEDERAL SESSION FREEZE PROPOSAL 
Whether it is true that Citizens United made it impossible to reduce 
the amount of money flowing into political campaigns, it is still critical 
that the government take steps to reduce the appearance of corruption. 
States enacted session freeze laws in part to help create a bright line be-
tween the two roles a politician must occupy: candidate and elected offi-
cial. The need for some kind of line between campaigning and governing 
is nothing new,
148
 and this Comment suggests that the introduction of a 
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session freeze at the federal level would help restore citizens’ faith in 
government and help ease the perception that an elected official’s vote is 
for sale. 
A. Congress Should Enact an Identity-Based Session Freeze During 
Congress’s Official Session 
Congress should enact a law to prohibit contributions by lobbyists 
and the employers of lobbyists while Congress is in official session. This 
proposal incorporates the factors cited with approval by state courts and 
avoids the issues that resulted in other state statutes being overturned. 
The proposal would only impact incumbent members of Congress. Addi-
tionally, the law would only regulate contributions by lobbyists and the 
employers of lobbyists.
149
 Furthermore, the ban would take place only 
while the chamber that the member belongs to is in session. This last el-
ement, however, is the most problematic as neither chamber of Congress 
meets full-time when they are called into session by leadership.
150
 Con-
versely, most state legislatures—including all state legislatures with ses-
sion freeze statutes—are part-time in nature and only meet full-time dur-
ing certain parts of the year.
151
 For example, the Washington State Legis-
lature meets ninety days in odd numbered years and sixty days in even 




Although the lack of a statutorily defined session appears to be an 
issue, the level of control the majority caucus leaders have renders this 
issue moot. At first glance, the lack of a definitive calendar might make 
it more difficult to easily pinpoint the times at which corruption, or the 
appearance of corruption, are most likely to take place. With further con-
sideration, however, it becomes clear that a session freeze law could still 
                                                                                                                                  
ble at http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p196697index.html (paper presented at the annual meet-
ing of the Midwest Political Science Association at the Palmer House Hotel in Chicago, Illinois). 
 149. It is important to note that there is already precedent for an identity-based restriction on 
donations to federal elected officials. 2 U.S.C. § 441c(a)(1)–(2) currently prohibits current or pro-
spective government contractors from making any contributions to federal elected officials at any 
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Court in Washington, D.C. See Wagner v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 854 F. Supp. 2d 83, 99 (D.D.C. 
2012). 
 150. In fact, Congress must only meet once a year to satisfy the Constitution’s requirements. 
See U.S. CONST. art. I § 4, cl. 2; U.S. CONST. amend. XX, § 2. The actual schedules of the House and 
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MAJORITYLEADER, http://majorityleader.gov/Calendar/ (last visited Aug. 31, 2013). 
 151. See, e.g., Full and Part-time Legislatures, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES, 
http://www.ncsl.org/legislatures-elections/legislatures/full-and-part-time-legislatures.aspx (last up-
dated June 2009). 
 152. Wash. Const. art. II, § 12. 
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follow the same template as a state session freeze law. A federal session 
freeze law should begin on the first day of the regular session for both 
chambers of Congress and last until the final day. Both chambers already 
take recesses to allow for district visits and campaigning,
153
 and it would 
be simple to turn those recesses into full adjournments and adjust the rest 
of the congressional calendar accordingly. 
While one can argue that elected officials might ignore the issue by 
continuing to use recesses rather than adjournments to allowed continual 
fundraising, this problem would be addressed at the ballot box. If mem-
bers of Congress do not appear to be spending enough time legislating, 
this problem can become a campaign issue that can, and likely will, be 
taken back to the electorate. Even members of Congress admit that they 
spend an inordinate amount of time fundraising.
154
 This issue is partially 
caused by the lack of a fixed session; citizens simply do not know when 
Congress is going about their work. This proposal would create an incen-
tive for politicians to partition their time and make it easier for the elec-
torate to see exactly how much time is spent legislating compared to 
fundraising. If the citizens did not agree, they would then be armed with 
sufficient information to take to the ballot box. 
Structurally, the proposal is substantively identical to the Vermont 
law upheld in Kimbell. The proposal would apply only to incumbent 
members of the legislature, affect only contributions from lobbyists and 
their employers, and last only while Congress is officially in session.
155
 
Additionally, this formula could easily be enacted in each of the twenty-
five states that do not currently have a session freeze law, which, as this 
Comment argues, makes it an effective tool to limit corruption or the ap-
pearance of corruption in national politics.
156
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IV. A FEDERAL SESSION FREEZE WOULD BE CONSTITUTIONAL 
Inevitably, any new federal campaign law will be challenged in 
court, particularly in this climate of deregulating the campaign indus-
try.
157
 The proposal in Part III is likely to survive such a challenge be-
cause it supports an accepted government interest—the prevention of 
corruption and the appearance of corruption—and is tailored in a way 
that has survived similar constitutional challenges. From a policy per-
spective, this proposal balances the need to allow elected officials to 
raise the funds necessary to compete in an election with the need to cre-
ate a bright-line delineation between governing and campaigning. Fur-
thermore, this proposal does not create an undue hardship—a potential 
constitutional challenge—on incumbent elected officials because state 
elected officials, while not elected at quite the staggering
158
 rate as feder-
al elected officials, are still reelected over 80% of the time.
159
 For exam-
ple in Washington state, which has a blanket restriction on contributions 
during session, only three incumbent elected officials out of one hundred 
forty-seven lost in 2012.
160
 In twelve of the fourteen states with blanket 
restrictions on contributions during session, only four incumbents on av-
erage lost their races per state.
161
 Furthermore, the creation of a bright 
line between governing and campaigning will help reduce citizen frustra-
tions about moneyed interests having too much influence. Although the 
2012 election was the most expensive election in history,
162
 it appears 
that money alone is not enough to buy an election.
163
 Accordingly, regu-
lating the amount of money raised and spent in a campaign alone is not 
enough to help restore citizens’ faith in government. While frustrations 
about campaign spending and accountability do not comprise the total 
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reason why citizens do not trust their government, it is a component, and 
one this proposal helps address. 
The next two subsections will evaluate the proposal suggested in 
Part III. As a threshold matter, subpart A will discuss the confusion 
around the standard of review for session freeze laws and demonstrate 
that exacting scrutiny is the proper standard of review. Subpart B will 
apply both standards of review to the proposal and demonstrate why it 
should be found constitutional if challenged. 
A. Exacting Scrutiny Is the Proper Standard of Review 
Because the proposal would likely be challenged, it is necessary to 
elaborate on the proper standard of review for session freeze laws. The 
proper standard of review for session freeze laws is exacting scrutiny. 
Unfortunately, the standard of review question has been muddled be-
cause lower courts have mistakenly applied strict scrutiny over the last 
thirty years. The decision some courts have made to apply strict scrutiny 
to session freeze laws appears to be based on the erroneous conclusion 
that a temporary ban on contributions is such a large constraint on speech 
that it should be considered more akin to an expenditure limit than a con-
tribution limit.
164




Buckley clearly provided that contribution limitations required a 
lesser standard of review than expenditure limitations because a limita-
tion on the amount of money a person can give to a candidate or cam-
paign organization “involves little direct restraint on his political com-
munication, for it permits the symbolic expression of support evidenced 
by a contribution but does not in any way infringe the contributor’s free-
dom to discuss candidates and issues.”
166
 Since Buckley, many cases 
have cited this rule with approval and applied the lower exacting scrutiny 
standard to contribution limitations.
167
 Conversely, the Supreme Court 
has rarely applied strict scrutiny to contribution limitations.
168
 Many 
lower courts thus appear to apply the more rigorous standard of review to 
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either ensure that they grant sufficient deference to the First Amendment 
or out of fear of being reversed by a higher court. 
The decision to apply strict scrutiny by the lower courts is often 
backed by illogical arguments and mischaracterizations of the exacting 
scrutiny standard. For example, the Eighth Circuit in Carver v. Nixon
169
 
chose to apply strict scrutiny after noting that Buckley and the subsequent 
United States Supreme Court cases chose to apply exacting scrutiny be-
cause “[t]he Court has not ruled that anything other than strict scrutiny 
applies in cases involving contribution limits.”
170
 This conclusion comes 
after a fairly exhaustive examination of opinions applying exacting scru-
tiny to contribution limits, which noted that exacting scrutiny is the 
standard applied in most majority and plurality opinions.
171
 Furthermore, 
the decisions by a few courts to apply strict scrutiny to contribution limi-
tation cases are then compounded because other courts will use those 
cases as a basis to apply strict scrutiny in their own decisions. For exam-
ple, the decision of the Fourth Circuit to use strict scrutiny in NCRTL 











ther partially or wholly premised their decision to apply strict scrutiny on 
the Florida Supreme Court’s holding in State v. Dodd. The Dodd court 
dealt with the standard of review in a cursory manner, noting only that 
“[a]ny restrictions the state imposes on the conduct [protected by the 
First Amendment] must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state 
interest.”
176
 What is more, the Dodd court cites Austin v. Michigan 




Reliance on Austin for the standard of review for contribution limi-
tation cases is erroneous for a number of reasons. First, the Supreme 
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Court held in Austin that the law in question did not violate the First 
Amendment, and it was utilizing strict scrutiny as part of an equal pro-
tection analysis under the Fourteenth Amendment.
178
 Second, the law in 
question in Austin prevented corporations from using general treasury 
funds for independent expenditures, to which Buckley clearly stated the 
proper standard of review was strict scrutiny.
179
 Finally, although this 
critique does not apply to the Florida Supreme Court in 1995 when Dodd 
was decided, it is important to note going forward that Austin is no long-
er good law because Citizens United overruled the case in 2010.
180
 
Similarly, the court in ARTL erroneously based its decision to apply 
strict scrutiny on a misstatement in McIntyre v. Ohio.
181
 In McIntyre, the 
Supreme Court claimed to subject the statute to exacting scrutiny review; 
however, the standard the Court articulated was actually strict scrutiny.
182
 
The court in ARTL took this to mean that strict scrutiny was the proper 
standard because the actual standard articulated by Supreme Court was 
closer to strict scrutiny.
183
 In contrast, the Vermont Supreme Court 
properly applied the exacting scrutiny standard in Kimbell, noting that 
the Buckley court expressly held that contribution limitations are held to 
a lower standard than expenditure limits.
184
 
Exacting scrutiny is the proper standard of review in session freeze 
cases because it is a bright-line rule that was expressly laid down by the 
Supreme Court in Buckley.
185
 Furthermore, as noted in Kimbell, exacting 
scrutiny is “less burdensome than the dollar limits upheld in Buckley”
186
 
because it sets “no overall limits” on contributions and functions “solely 
as a timing measure, banning contributions to individual members only 
while the General Assembly is in session.”
187
 Furthermore, session freeze 
laws do not prohibit contributions to political parties, PACs, or any other 
political entity during session—only those made to individual legislators. 
This allows other outlets for individuals who wish to make political con-
tributions during session and do not want to wait until after the session 
freeze has ended. The ability to donate to other political causes, like po-
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 180. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 364. 
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litical parties and PACs, lessens the overall restriction a session freeze 
law places on freedom of speech. 
B. Proposal Meets Both Strict and Exacting Scrutiny 
Although exacting scrutiny
188
 is the proper standard of review—as 
noted above—the proposal will also likely meet strict scrutiny review. 
There is little doubt that combating corruption or the appearance of cor-
ruption is a compelling government interest.
189
 The weakest part of the 
analysis for strict scrutiny is the narrowly tailored element, as strict scru-
tiny requires there to be no less-restrictive alternatives. Although a diffi-
cult standard to meet, this proposal is narrowly crafted and would most 
likely survive both closely drawn and narrowly tailored review. 
1. Preventing Corruption and the Appearance of Corruption Are Compel-
ling and Sufficiently Important Government Interests 
There is little doubt that combating corruption and the appearance 
of corruption are sufficient government interests to survive both strict 
and exacting scrutiny. First, every court that has considered a session 
freeze statute has agreed that the anti-corruption interest is compelling.
190
 
The universal acceptance of the prevention of corruption as a govern-
ment interest in campaign finance demonstrates that this interest is suffi-
cient to meet the first prong of either exacting or strict scrutiny review. 
Preventing corruption by barring lobbyists from directly donating to leg-
islators while their projects are being considered will help ensure that the 
public’s trust in the political process is not further harmed. Additionally, 
as noted in NCRTL, “[l]egislative action which is procured directly 
through gifts, or even campaign contributions, too often fails to reflect 
what is in the public interest, what enjoys public support, or what repre-




Second, the anti-corruption interest demonstrated by preventing 
contributions from lobbyists while legislators are voting satisfies even 
the narrowest reading of Citizens United. The Citizens United Court 
adopted a very narrow construction of what constitutes corruption or the 
appearance of corruption. In the minds of the majority in Citizens United, 
only the danger of quid pro quo corruption is enough to constitute a 
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compelling government interest.
192
 This proposal directly aligns with this 
interest by only barring contributions to currently sitting members of 
Congress who are presently considering legislation and, furthermore, 
only limits contributions by lobbyists and their employers who necessari-
ly have a direct stake in that legislation. Although the court in ARTL 
claimed that only large contributions represented a danger of corrup-
tion,
193
 this sentiment was rejected by Buckley. 
The Court in Buckley squarely disavowed the idea that a court 
should supplant the decision of the legislature about what level of contri-
bution limits were acceptable.
194
 Furthermore, the Court further clarified 
this conclusion when it held that only contribution limits that prevent a 
candidate from amassing enough funds to compete violated the First 
Amendment.
195
 This proposal does not institute any limitation on the 
amount or method by which a candidate can raise funds or a donor can 
contribute them. Rather, as noted in NCRTL, session freeze laws only 
create a temporary bar on when these funds may be raised.
196
 Moreover, 
the court in NCRTL dealt with the argument that only large contributions 
corrupt directly, noting that “[c]orruption, either petty or massive, is a 
compelling state interest because it distorts both the concept of popular 
sovereignty and the theory of representative government.”
197
 
Finally, virtually every case that has interpreted any kind of cam-
paign finance regulation—be it a contribution limit, expenditure limit, 
disclosure, or public financing—has noted that the anti-corruption inter-
est is compelling.
198
 In fact, the Supreme Court has noted that limitations 
on contributions are the “primary means” by which the Court has al-
lowed the government to limit corruption.
199
 
Therefore, the proposal would be found to meet exacting scrutiny 
because it serves the compelling interest of preventing corruption and the 
appearance of corruption, which has been recognized as the only “inter-
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est sufficiently important to outweigh the First Amendment interests im-
plicated by contributions for political speech.”
200
 
2. The Proposal Is Both Narrowly Tailored and Closely Drawn 
It is less certain if the proposal is sufficiently tailored to meet the 
anti-corruption interest required by strict scrutiny. Each of the state ses-
sion freeze statutes that have been found unconstitutional was struck 
down because it failed the tailoring prong of the analysis.
201
 That being 
said, this proposal is constructed in such a way to avoid the pitfalls that 
caused most other session freeze laws to be struck down. 
First, the proposal only applies to incumbents, who are sitting 
members of Congress. This construction avoids the over and underinclu-
sive tailoring issues caused by including non-sitting candidates. The anti-
corruption interest is strongest when it is most closely linked to those 
who are most likely to be corrupted. Because challengers themselves 
cannot directly vote for or against legislative proposals, several courts 
found laws that included them to be overbroad.
202
 Furthermore, by ex-
cluding challengers, this proposal avoids being an incumbency protection 
measure because it burdens sitting members only and does not place any 
restriction on challengers. By only affecting incumbents, this proposal 
answers one of the major concerns of the Dodd court 
203
 as well as a fre-
quent critique of other campaign finance reform efforts.
204
 
Second, the proposal only affects lobbyists and those that employ 
them. Lobbyists are an everyday part of life in Washington, D.C., just as 
they are in state legislatures. Lobbyists meet with members day in and 
day out to attempt to persuade them to support or oppose certain projects. 
Because of this close working relationship, lobbyists have increased ac-
cess to legislators, and thus an increased ability to influence their ac-
tions.
205
 Furthermore, the same lobbyists who work with legislators to 
craft and pass proposals are typically the same individuals who hand out 
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contribution checks during campaign season.
206
 The fact that lobbyists 
exist in these dual roles creates a problematic issue for campaign finance 
regulation. Even if lobbyists are not intending to, or actually engaging in, 
pay-to-play politics with elected officials, there will always be the ap-
pearance that this is occurring. This is why the anti-corruption interest 
allows for the appearance of corruption to be a compelling interest. As 
noted in NCRTL, “[e]ven if lobbyists have no intention of directly ‘pur-
chasing’ favorable treatment, appearances may be otherwise.”
207
 Thus, 
by restricting the timing of contributions by those who have the highest 
incentive to engage in quid pro quo corruption, the proposal is closely 
drawn to only capture the most troublesome contacts. Moreover, this lim-
itation addresses the very real appearance of corruption that worries 
many citizens. 
Finally, the proposal is only in effect during regular sessions of 
Congress, which is the time during which quid pro quo corruption is 
most likely to take place. By focusing only on the time when actual votes 
on laws are taking place, the proposal focuses on the time at which the 
most pressure could be brought to bear on elected officials. As noted by 
the Kimbell court, a limited prohibition that focuses on the “narrow peri-
od during which legislators could be, or could appear to be, pressured, 
coerced, or tempted into voting on the basis of cash contributions rather 
than on consideration of the public weal”
208
 is closely drawn to address 
that specific concern. Although some courts were concerned that the ex-
clusion of contributions at other points in the year are underinclusive be-
cause those contributions could corrupt,
209
 this argument ignores the 
basic workings of a legislature. It is common for bills to be amended as 
part of the legislative process and for amendments to cause a legislator 
who once authored a bill to oppose it.
210
 Claiming that an elected official 
could be corrupted by a contribution made when a bill is in its infancy 
ignores this basic reality. Additionally, limiting the law to only regular 
sessions removes the concern that fundraising would become impossible 
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due to infinite special sessions.
211
 Furthermore, because the U.S. House 
and Senate create their own schedules,
212
 they are not vulnerable to a 
special session called by a governor, as are state legislatures. Moreover, 
this fact means the leadership in Congress can evaluate—with input from 
their members—how much time is needed to campaign versus legislate 
and ensure that Congress is not in session when members would need 
time to fundraise. Finally, this flexibility has a backstop in the political 
process; if the voters feel that Congress is spending too much time fund-
raising and not enough campaigning, they can choose to elect a challeng-
er. Thus, the proposal clearly meets the closely drawn requirement of the 
strict scrutiny standard because it only affects the parties most likely to 
be corrupted during the most likely time for corruption to occur. 
However, it is much less certain that the proposal can meet the nar-
rowly tailored prong of strict scrutiny. Although it can be argued that this 
proposal does not meet the narrowly tailored standard because there are 
less restrictive alternatives, this argument is not compelling. Federal 
criminal laws that bar legislators from taking money for votes do nothing 
to address the fact that this requires actual corruption to have already 
occurred. As noted in NCRTL, the First Amendment does not prevent 
governments from recognizing the potential for corruption and “taking 
reasonable steps to ensure that the appearance of corruption does not un-
dermine public confidence in the integrity of representative democra-
cy.”
213
 The appearance of corruption is no less compelling than actual 
corruption,
214
 and criminal laws do nothing to prevent the appearance of 
undue influence that exist in the interwoven nature of lobbying and cam-
paigning. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Post-Citizens United, many professionals are concerned about the 
appearance of our campaigns, and the potential influence of unlimited 
money on candidates.
215
 That being said, the current Supreme Court ap-
pears to strongly favor deregulation and a policy of non-legislative inter-
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ference into the political speech arena.
216
 To deal with these two contra-
dictory realities, it is important for reformers to think outside of the box 
and have a clear idea of the outcome they are trying to produce. 
In the current climate of the Supreme Court, it is probably impossi-
ble to take any real steps to remove or reduce the role of money in poli-
tics. The inertia on the Court is simply too strong against regulating 
money as speech. Even should some of the more conservative members 
retire in the next few years, the Court would still have to grapple with 
stare decisis and overruling one of its biggest recent decisions. Perhaps 
rather than trying to reduce the amount of money in politics, the real fo-
cus should be on trying to figure out why citizens do not feel well repre-
sented in their government or trust the campaign process. It is with this 
concept in mind that this Comment suggests a proposal that creates a 
more bright-line difference between the time elected officials spend 
campaigning and the time they spend governing.   
Although it can be argued that the proposal does not make any ma-
jor changes in how campaign contributions are gathered, perhaps that is 
why it is likely to succeed. Because it is not taking any major steps to 
undermine the precedent the Court has already articulated, it has a 
chance to be one part of combating the distrust by which regular citizens 
view the political system. If we refuse to take small steps for fear that 
they are akin to rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic, we are miss-
ing the point of our legislative process and missing a chance to take a 
chance to improve citizens’ relationship with their government. 
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